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1 Introduction
How rich countries got rich and why poor countries stay poor gets to the heart of concerns
regarding economic change and persistent under-development. There is no shortage of the-
ories that seek to explain comparative economic development. In this paper, we zoom in
on three basic narratives—geography, institutions and economic structures. By geography
we mean those natural factors (climate, temperature, soil fertility) that affect economic out-
comes (Sachs 2001; Khemraj 2015) and institutions refer to the humanly devised constraints
that structure political, economic, and social interaction (North 1991). We define economic
structures as the aggregate representation of a country’s technological capabilities (Constan-
tine 2017b). This can be measured by summary indices such as economic complexity of a
country’s export basket (Hidalgo et al. 2009). Thus, there are low, mid and high-technology
economic structures. This article synthesizes these useful insights into a coherent framework
that in our view can better explain how rich countries got rich, why poor countries stay poor
and the mechanics of emerging economies.
The goal of this synthesis is to build on the insights of various traditions in economic
development to advance a new narrative for the political economy of development. It goes
as follows. Economic change or persistence is the outcome of distributional conflict. The
haves—those with economic assets and power1—have vested interests in the status quo—
the present economic structure and its corresponding distribution of resources. The have
nots contest this allocation and the structural origins of their dispossession—the economic
structure and politco-institutional forms. Inclusive economic change—economic growth with
lower inequality—is the outcome of an elite bargain that has two pillars: 1. An agenda
for economic transformation towards a more complex and technology-intensive economic
structure and 2. The reduction of distributional tensions in time t. Imagine the latter as
a minimal welfare state—some short-term capital-labour compromise and the former as a
long-term compromise that propagate Kuznets dynamics—changing income distribution as
a consequence of structural changes.
A production structure—we use this interchangeably with economic structure—based on
a wide mix of complex products has a wider range of occupational choices, flatter hierar-
chy of occupational structure, wider diffusion of skills and knowledge, and deepening class
1In our set up, there are de jure (e.g. political institutions) and de facto (e.g. economic resources) sources
of power. Power is thus defined as the de jure or de facto ability to direct or influence the behaviour of
others or the course of events.
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consciousness, thus producing lower income inequality. Further, as structuralists have long
argued, complex economic structures at the macro level or high-technology commodities at
the micro level are growth enhancing; if only because they have higher income elasticity
of demand in export markets, are more conducive for technical change and support higher
wages and profits. These insights reveal the following. First, production structures jointly
determine economic growth and income distribution. Second, economic change or persis-
tence is determined by how social contestation change or reinforce the economic structure
respectively. Our synthesis shows that historically, geography determined the technologi-
cal content of economic structures (economic growth) and by extension, the distribution of
income and its corresponding intensity of distributional conflict.
Through the use of case studies—Guyana, Barbados and Mauritius—and using a com-
parative historical analysis methodology that is substantivist in nature, we show that insti-
tutions of production—industrial policies—as opposed to simply institutions of exchange—
protection of private property—engender growth enhancing structural transformation. The
Mauritian miracle best demonstrates this, and the Guyana and Barbados cases highlight the
relevance of geography in shaping economic structures and income distribution. Specifically,
Barbados’ natural endowment of beaches led to tourism services and a superior growth pro-
cess as compared to Guyana, which is still dependent on low-technology commodities like
sugar and gold. Tourism services have a high luxury content with higher income elasticity
of demand in export markets. However, Barbados, like Mauritius in more recent years, has
developed an offshore financial centre since the 1970s that produces an extractive growth
process—economic growth with increasing inequality. The distributional implications of fi-
nancial services are rising top incomes (Kaplan and Rauh 2010)—this has been the Mauritian
story since the mid 2000s—a striking contrast to its miracle years (1970s to mid 2000s) of
falling top incomes and industrialization.
The case studies reveal that top incomes in the respective countries have deep colonial ori-
gins and the inclusive Mauritian miracle is the outcome of an elite bargain, largely facilitated
by the good fortune of sugar rents. In contrast, high income inequality still plagues Barbados
and Guyana since their economic elites have been mostly unchallenged. Consequently, top
income earners use their de facto power to influence economic policy that entrenches their
income position. We argue that this is a fundamental explanation for why both Barbados
and Guyana still rely on a production structure of low-technology content.
Our new narrative and case studies reveal distributional contestation and production
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structure as deep determinants of relative development, as compared to the new institutional
economics tradition that emphasizes distribution and political institutions. Our analytical
framework and case studies demonstrate that the choice and performance of political and
economic institutions depend on which interest group wins the distributional conflict and
the technology-intensity of the economic structure. Though the traditions of geography, eco-
nomic structures and institutions are competing hypotheses, they share sufficiently common
features to provide a synthesis. Our starting point is economic structure as the basis of
economic growth. In pre-modern times, geography was the sole determinant of production
possibilities—economic structure. Further, economic institutions form the incentive system
to reinforce or change the production structure and as the case studies show, institutions of
production rather than of exchange promote growth enhancing structural transformation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of
the three fundamental causes of relative development and section 3 presents our theoretical
framework. Section 4 outlines the case studies and section 5 concludes.
2 Three Fundamental Causes
In this section, we sketch the three basic hypotheses of comparative economic development.
2.1 Geography
Machiavelli (1531) is among the earlier proponents of the geography hypothesis and in re-
cent times a substantial empirical literature has emerged. In its simplest form, Sachs (2001)
documents a positive relationship between climate and temperature on the one hand and
economic development on the other. More complex variants highlight the disease environ-
ment (Sachs and Malaney 2002), natural resource endowments (Sachs and Warner 2001),
transport conditions (Rappaport and Sachs 2003) and type of agriculture (Khemraj 2015).
Given these competing mechanisms, the debate centers on the causal channels. Sachs and
his co-authors contend that the central mechanisms are through geography’s impact on agri-
cultural productivity and the disease environment. Warm climates are prone to tropical
diseases and extremes of heavy rainfall or drought, which adversely affect health conditions
and agricultural growth respectively. Khemraj argues that polder agriculture incurs high
drainage and irrigation costs, which lead to wage suppression and extractive growth.
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2.2 Institutions
Acemoglu et al. (2003) claim that geography, in particular its disease channel, has an in-
direct effect on economic development through institutions. They argue that malaria and
yellow fever were decisive factors in determining European settlement in newly colonized
areas. Naturally, European settlement was limited in areas with high mortality rates and
the converse was true. In the latter case, Europeans were more likely to establish protection
for private property and some degree of adult suffrage, both of which encourage social and
economic development. The new consensus is that economic institutions are the fundamen-
tal cause of long run growth, that is, the protection of private property (Acemoglu et al.
2005). Since this is dependent on the political rules and system—political institutions are
deep determinants of economic performance (North 1990).
2.3 Economic Structures
Structuralists argue that non-settlement colonies are relatively poor because of their low-
technology exports (e.g. sugar) that produce declining terms of trade (Singer 1950), low
wages and weak inter-sectoral linkages (Prebisch 1950). The earlier proponents of this tra-
dition date back to Botero’s Greatnesse of Cities (Reinert 2016), which explained why cities
were the repositories of wealth—they had extensive divisions of labour, technical change
and high value added as a ratio to imported raw materials. Thirlwall (1979) presents a
theoretical model that demonstrates how a country’s rate of economic growth is determined
by the growth of foreign demand and the ratio of income elasticities of demand for exports
and imports. Countries with more limited production technologies have higher elasticities
of demand for imports. This thesis of balance of payment constrained growth—growth con-
strained by low-technology economic structures—has been verified by numerous empirical
studies. See Bertola et al. (2002) for focus on LAC, McCombie (1997) for UK, USA and




Historically, geography was the early determinant of what and how goods were produced (see
Diamond 1999: chap. 2, 5). Land-locked countries had qualitatively different production
possibilities as compared to islands or geographies with easier access to coast lines. In
the West Indies, climate and soil fertility were crucial in forming their sugar economies,
while natural gifts like gold and silver laid the foundation for mining economies in Spanish
America (Engerman et al. 2002). But with modern technologies, the geographical origins of
production possibilities (what and how) become less important. Still, the historical value of
geography and its demise present a crucial insight—that the what and how are central to the
process of economic change. Our geographical synthesis is simply to present a framework
that is consistent with historical time and implies the following.
geography =⇒ economic structuret.
3.2 Economic Performance & Distribution
Why do economic structures matter for growth? First, higher value added economic activities
are produced in imperfectly competitive markets that keep wages and profits elevated for
longer periods. This sustains aggregate demand and internal growth. Second, Dasgupta and
Stiglitz (1980) explain that imperfectly competitive market structures are more conducive
for innovation and technical progress—this is recently supported by Andreoni (2014). Third,
Constantine (2017b) notes that production structures based on increasing returns economic
activities are more likely to fertilize the seeds of democratic transition and consolidation;
and following Aghion et al. (2008), democratic property rights are crucial for the diffusion of
technology. Fourth, economic activities with increasing returns enjoy higher income elasticity
of demand in export markets and this make them ideal growth propellers for highly open
economies (Thirlwall 1979). Fifth, Constantine (2017b) notes that job ladders are longer for
technology-intensive economic activities and serve as an important mechanism for upward
labour mobility, which improves the distribution of income. Sixth, Constantine (2016b)
and (Hartmann 2014: 60-61) contend that a country’s economic structure is an important
determinant of the allocation of human capital between entrepreneurship and rent seeking
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(broadly defined); and therefore, indirectly affects the growth process through the labour
market. It follows that technology-intensive production structures are growth enhancing
because they stimulate demand for wealth creating activities like entrepreneurship.
Economic structures in period t not only determine the size of the pie, but also the





A production structure based on a wide mix of complex products is more likely to have a
wide range of occupational choices, relatively flat hierarchy of occupational structure, wide
diffusion of skills and knowledge and deepening class consciousness (unionization) (Hart-
mann 2014: 70). It follows that relatively complex economies have structural limits to the
growth in top incomes, high wage shares and a strong middle class—less inequality. This
is where supply and demand intersects our framework. High-technology production struc-
tures engender relatively high wage shares and robust demand-led growth. See Hartmann
et al. (2017), Hartmann et al. (2016), Constantine (2017a), Galbraith and Berner (2001)
and Conceicao and Galbraith (2002) for empirical support. Hartman and his co-authors
find that production structure as proxied by the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) is in-
versely related to the Gini for over 150 countries between 1963-2008. They also calculated a
Product Gini Index (PGI)—a weighted average of the Gini coefficients of the countries that
export a product. Products like cocoa beans, flour and animal hair are consistent with Gini
coefficients that exceed 0.5, while textile machinery and paper machine parts produce much
lower Gini coefficients. Other approaches include the University of Texas Inequality Project,
which uses industrial statistics to produce inequality measures like the Theil Index.
3.3 Power & Institutions
The distribution of income is a fundamental determinant of de facto political power—that
power not allocated by formal political institutions like a constitution or government agency.
When income inequality is extremely high, say 19th Century Europe or present day US
and Europe—the rich have disproportional influence on formal political institutions (Piketty




 =⇒ de facto political powertde jure political powert

De jure political power is derived from political institutions, say a constitution that
outlines the powers of a President or the principle of separation of powers. But we have just
noted how de facto political power is leveraged to influence formal political institutions—
like a wealth-based requirement for voting. We argue that there is a complex interaction
between de facto and de jure political powers and the strength of this interaction depends
on the extent of income inequality. When extreme inequalities of income are present, de jure
political power is hijacked by the de facto influence of the rich. Conversely, when the growth
in top incomes is constrained, there is meaningful separation between de facto and de jure
political powers.
We illustrate below how de facto power influences future political institutions. Elites
infinitely prefer to exercise control and influence over time and one way of committing current
and future politicians is by legislating elite-friendly laws. This is effective in developed
countries where institutions are enforced but in the case of developing countries, enforcement
is the exception rather than the rule. Public and academic interest in reducing corruption
demonstrate the problem of enforcing certain legislations in these countries. In cases where
political institutions are inadequately enforced, elites find other means of influencing current
and future policy. One effective way is to protect the basis of their economic position—the
present economic structure. It follows that elites influence de jure political power to enforce






↘ economic institutionst =⇒ economic structuret
The strategy of promoting structural rigidity is the same as advancing elite-friendly
legislation—both are slow changing and consequently, serve as effective methods of exercising
power and influence over time. One noteworthy example is Latin America’s economic elites
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prevention of land reform (Engerman et al. 2002: 64).
It is important to draw the distinction between institutions of production—industrial
polices: tariffs, subsidies, cheap credit and institutions of exchange—property rights and the
rule of law. Reinert (2007) argues that institutions of production promote growth enhanc-
ing structural change, while institutions of exchange engender structural and institutional
inertia. Reinert explains that property rights may enhance growth by exploiting existing op-
portunities or creating new opportunities for trade within an existing production structure.
Pulling all the pieces together leads to the following schematic of our framework, where
the dotted lines illustrate the various competing hypotheses (Figure 1). Economic structure
and income distribution are our two state variables2, knowledge of these in time t is suffi-
cient to determine all other variables in the system. A country’s economic structure in time
t determines its current economic performance and income distribution in t+1. Historically,
geography played a central role in the formation of economic structures, this is less so today
but not unimportant. Income distribution in time t determines the complex relationship
between de facto and de jure political powers and influences the evolution of political insti-
tutions over time and the type of economic institutions enforced. These in turn determine
the economic structure—either structural change or persistence.
The fundamental source of persistence is the economic structure and it has two dimen-
sions. First, it is slow changing and second, it generates an income distribution and cor-
responding distribution of de facto power that influences current de jure political power to
maintain the economic structure in time t. Notwithstanding the tendency towards persis-
tence, our model emphasizes the potential for change. Shocks to de facto political power—
say, through warfare, revolutions or epidemics that significantly alter the distribution of
income—can lead to fundamental changes in both political and economic institutions and
consequently, the economic structure. Alternatively, shocks to the economic structure, say
through technological innovations or donor policy intervention, alter the growth calculus,
the distribution of income and the evolution of the system.
How does our framework relate to the model presented by Acemoglu et al. (2005). Both
frameworks agree that the distribution of resources and its evolution are central determinants
of economic persistence and change. However, unlike our model, these scholars posit that
political institutions are the second state variable. We place less emphasis on political insti-
2A state variable is one of the set of variables that describe the behavior of a dynamical system, particularly
its future behavior in the absence of shocks to the system.
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tutions and their de jure power because their effectiveness largely depend on the distribution
of income and the corresponding distribution of de facto power. Moreover, our framework
demonstrates that the distribution of resources is not independent of an economy’s produc-
tion structure. Thus, our framework recommends industrial polices rather than institutional
reforms (institutions of exchange) as a means to economic change.
4 Case Studies
In the case studies that follow, we do not provide a detailed account of the political and
economic history of the respective countries. Rather, by way of analytical narratives we
illustrate the workings of our model.
4.1 Guyana
Guyana, like many of its sister colonies in the Caribbean, was used primarily for sugar cul-
tivation. Its immediate hinterland made inland farming too expensive and its distance from
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the coast made transport and trade prohibitive (Taeuber 1952; Khemraj 2015). Khemraj
notes that the Dutch colonizers opted for the coastland for settlement and agriculture af-
ter originally settling in the riverine hinterland. But the coastland is below sea level and
thus, prone to flooding, which made agriculture a costly economic activity (Williams 1945).
Sustained profits required wage suppression, high sugar prices and political lobbying by the
planter class for preferential prices (Adamson 1972: 33). It follows that geography played
a central role in determining the location of settlement and costs of production. Moreover,
soil fertility placed a premium on agricultural produce—sugar—a low-technology commodity
with diminishing returns.
We have demonstrated how low-technology commodities like sugar, produce high in-
equality and when this is paired with political inequality (slavery)—Guyana becomes an
oligarchic society. Therefore, to understand the dynamics of change or lack thereof in the
Guyana case, its low-technology economic structure and high income inequality must be
central to the analysis. These are the two state variables in our framework.
The abolition of slavery in 1834 gave way to the village movement (Rodney 1981)—the
acquisition of land by ex-slaves for purposes of housing and non-sugar farming (Josiah 1997).
This was facilitated by high saving propensities and Bourne (1975) estimates these to be
between 0.21-0.41 based on annual wages and land outlays. It is important to emphasize here
that the village movement and its consequent development of an independent peasantry were
the outcome of Guyana’s land size (geography) relative to its labour supply (Farley 1964).
It follows that geography played a key role in enhancing the bargaining power of ex-slaves
vis-a-vis the planter class—(Rodney 1981: 648) notes that they bargained for higher wages
and better working conditions. This is a clash of interests that threatens the distribution of
political and economic power and the economic viability of high-cost sugar cultivation.
This formidable threat led to a new economic institution—indentureship—that sought
to do two things: 1. Reduce the labour cost of sugar production and by extension, rein-
force the production structure and 2. Reduce aggregate wage share and therefore, maintain
high income inequality. But indentureship does not address the geographical origins of the
emerging independent peasantry. This led to another key economic institution—land pol-
icy (Farley 1954), which prevented ex-slaves from acquiring more lands. Moreover, Bourne
(1975) explains that prohibitive taxes were imposed on the commodities consumed by ex-
slaves and Danns (1997) contends that they were deliberately denied access to credit. These
economic policies were the sources of persistent inequality and limited structural change—the
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land policy prevented the growth of non-sugar economic activities. This historical account
demonstrates our equilibrium of political power, institutions and economic structure.
The policy of indentureship led to the immigration of Chinese, Indians and Portuguese
and Guyana’s ethnic cleavages or distrust served as the basis of political mobilization—
even today. It follows that distributional conflict assumes a multi-ethnic dimension and
complicates the evolution of political institutions and the dynamics of structural change and
persistence. For example: growth-enhancing structural change produces winners and losers
and the ethnic distribution of the payoff structure is central in determining whether or not (or
how) structural change is promoted. In terms of the how—structural change in the direction
of inequality-promoting economic activities serve existing interests and we call this primitive
diversification. With the inflow of indentured labourers, colonial administrators encouraged
Portuguese to undertake non-tradable economic activities like commerce and retail trading
(Moore 1975). These non-tradables increased income inequality and elevated the economic
status of the Portuguese and over time even rivaled the plantocracy (Wager 1975).
Constantine (2017c) presents new evidence to show that the richest 10 percent in Guyana
owns 41 percent of household income as of 2013, the same level of income concentration in
1960. Further, he posits that this elite group has its colonial origins in the rise of the
Portuguese. Why is this consequential to economic change? At the most basic level, eco-
nomic elites seek to protect the economic basis of their top incomes or only advocate for
primitive diversification. Here lies an important source of Guyana’s failure to ignite the
process of growth-enhancing structural transformation. Chandisingh (1983), Thomas (1988)
and Ishmael (1993) argue that the de facto power of elites were largely unchallenged under
both dictatorship and democracy in Guyana. For this reason, only primitive diversifica-
tion took place under both political systems. In present day Guyana, economic elites are
not exclusively of Portuguese origin, they are now a complex web that includes both Afro-
and Indo-Guyanese but this hardly alters the story—these economic elites have entrenched
interests in promoting only primitive diversification.
The evolution of Guyana’s productive base has been along the periphery of the global
production matrix. It has moved away from mono-crop sugar production to non-tradable
economic services and to a tradable basket of primarily rice, sugar, bauxite, gold, diamonds
and non-traditional agriculture. Like sugar in its colonial history, bauxite served as the prin-
cipal export in the 70s and gold now plays a similar role. Given this primitive diversification,
it is no surprise that Constantine (2017c) finds little evidence of a Kuznets wave as it relates
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to top incomes in Guyana.
Recently, Guyana has discovered oil and invited Exxon Mobil to undertake further ex-
ploration and production. Like other low-technology commodities, oil is located on the
periphery of the global production matrix but has the potential to transform the economy.
However, initial conditions of high income inequality does not augur well for an oil boom;
the latter is likely to exacerbate distributional tensions. Guyana’s own history also suggests
that the oil economy is likely to do more harm than good. As noted earlier, sugar, bauxite
and gold were at different times dominant exports and presented similar possibilities as does
the oil economy. But as in the present day, initial conditions under colonialism were aligned
in the interest of special groups that ensured that the growth process was extractive and
economic diversification was primitive.
Inevitably, we have omitted numerous details about the history of Guyana, in particular,
its well-known ethnic preferences and voting pattern (Khemraj 2016). This is less important
for the purpose of illustrating the workings of our model. Guyana’s ethnic conflict divides
the working class and exacerbates the distributional conflict, which only reinforces one of our
state variable—inequality—as a law of motion that explains Guyana’s economic and political
development. When this law of motion is juxtaposed with a low-technology productive
structure, Guyana’s persistent under-development or lack of growth enhancing and inclusive
structural change become a stable equilibrium outcome. Fundamentally, its erratic growth
and highly unequal distributional outcomes are determined by the low-technology content
of its productive base.
4.2 Barbados
The colonial economic structure of Barbados—mono-crop sugar production— is not appre-
ciably different from colonial Guyana. Yet, a substantial divergence between these countries
is observed (DaCosta 2007; Grenade and Lewis-Bynoe 2011). The Guyana case allows us to
demonstrate the dynamic equilibrium of under-development with the use of our framework,
while the Barbados case is well positioned to illustrate the workings of relative development.
Unlike Guyana, Barbados has a unique geographical endowment. It was well suited for
permanent residency and developed a relatively large white settlement (Beckles 2007: 53)
and (Dawson 2011: 136). Even in present day, Barbados is widely known for its luxury
tourism—a key earner of foreign exchange and means of employment.
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A short digression on European settlement and the development of “inclusive” institutions
is useful here. While Barbados had a relatively large European settlement, the historical
evidence shows that Barbados had an extractive governance framework; contrary to the
prediction of New Institutional Economics. Barbados was the only Caribbean island to not
abolish its system of elite representation in favour of Crown Rule (DaCosta 2007). Nicholls
(1969) argues that Barbados was the same as it had been three hundred years earlier; instead
of slaves and planters, it was made up of planters and a free but landless population. It follows
that Barbados’ relative development cannot be explained by “inclusive” institutions through
the settlement of Europeans—the causal explanation must lie elsewhere. Finally, the legacy
of extractive institutions plagues modern Barbados. One example is its Defamation Act—
originally conceived in colonial Barbados to silence dissenters—which presently engenders a
norm of self-censorship (Tennyson and Barrow-Giles 2008) and threatens potential corporate
whistleblowers (Alleyne et al. 2017). Collectively, these lead to what Tennyson and Barrow-
Giles (2008) call a culture of fear.
Dunn (1969) notes that the great majority of landholders were small farmers in colonial
Barbados and DaCosta (2007) attributes this to the small size of the island, which led to high
land prices and modest landholdings. Dunn estimates that 71 percent of landholders were
small planters—landholders with fewer than twenty slaves in 1679. Also, Barbados’ small
land size facilitated intense sugar cultivation of the entire island (Beckles 2007). Furthermore,
Cumper (1962) notes that the oligarchic ownership of arable land remained until the 1950s.
Downes (1987) provides evidence to show that in 1970 the top 10 percent of landowners
owned 77 percent of the land in Barbados. This historical account and recent evidence
(Constantine 2017a) firmly establish Barbados as an island with high income concentration.
A critical juncture of the divergence between Guyana and Barbados is the immediate
post-emancipation period. While Guyana experienced rising labour cost (Bulmer-Thomas
2012: 74) and growth in the de facto power of ex-slaves, Barbados maintained its plantation
system and increased output immediately after abolition (Bulmer-Thomas 2012: 60). Unlike
Guyana, the land to labour supply ratio is small and this kept ex-slaves in a constant state
of tenantry. In other words, after abolition, ex-slaves continued to work for the plantation
enterprise (Barrow 1983) and this kept wages low and profits and output high as compared
to Guyana. This demonstrates one mechanism of how the geographical differences between
Guyana and Barbados were historically consequential.
Economic inequality and the geographical endowment that valorize luxury tourism en-
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gender a significant change in the production structure of the Barbados economy. Here lies
the fundamental source of the Barbados-Guyana divergence. Why does luxury tourism pro-
duce more stable growth than low-technology commodities? First, it has a higher income
elasticity of demand in world markets (Onafowora and Owoye 2012) and this ties Barbados’
growth cycle to those in developed countries. Second, the full exploitation of luxury tourism
leads to institutional spillovers that are growth intensive. Constantine (2016a) explains that
luxury commodities have certain institutional requirements that are similar in nature to the
institutions required to fully exploit technology-intensive economic activities. In the case of
beach tourism—the Barbados case—institutional and organizational inputs range from low
crime to adequate public services. In the absence of these, travel advisories from foreign
governments are likely to encourage tourists to stay away. In short, the institutional inputs
for luxury tourism create an attractive business climate.
Did the shift to luxury tourism promote primitive diversification or inclusive structural
change? To provide an answer, we need to understand the shift to tourism3 services as
a change to a wider range of services, including financial services (Premdas 2013; Barrow
1983). Both tourism services and the FIRE4 economy were developed around the 1970s
(Bulmer-Thomas 2012: 617). While the FIRE economy and luxury tourism generated bet-
ter economic performance relative to Guyana, they also engendered an extractive growth
process in Barbados. See Premdas (2013) and Barrow (1983) for a discussion on how the
old commercial elites transformed themselves into conglomerates that dominate the distribu-
tive trade and the FIRE economy. Like the sugar economy in colonial Barbados, the FIRE
economy serves as the economic foundation of the oligarchy.
Consistent with our framework, we have demonstrated how Barbados’ geographical en-
dowments shape its economic structure and consequently its growth mechanics and income
distribution. Further, we have illustrated the structural origins of Barbados’ “inclusive”
institutions. But when we take a closer look beyond the hidden abode of production and
repeal the veil of “inclusive” institutions, we observe a deeply extractive growth process.
While de jure political power is in the hands of the voting masses, de facto political power
is concentrated in a group with close ties to Barbados’ colonial legacy (Barrow 1983).
The Guyana-Barbados comparison demonstrates the salience of geography in forming
3Barbados had experienced a short stint of manufacturing but its government industrial plan of 1978-1982
noted that the smallness of the island is a natural constraint, see Potter (1981) for details.
4FIRE economy refers to Finance, Insurance and Real Estate.
14
production possibilities—low-technology and high-luxury economic activities in Guyana and
Barbados, respectively. Notwithstanding this qualitative difference in economic structures,
their colonial history established the foundation of extreme economic and political inequality
that affect the evolution of political and economic institutions today. Initial conditions of
high economic inequality firmly establish de facto political power in the hands of a select
group, usually with close colonial ties. It is this economic group that guides economic
transformation in the direction that fortifies their income position. However, this outcome is
not inevitable, but only the consequence of unchallenged vested interests. It is unlikely that
vested interests will facilitate an inclusive economic transformation but there is no guarantee
that confrontation with economic elites will lead to the adequate enforcement of institutions
of production. Inclusive economic development is the reward for those countries that manage
to do the latter.
4.3 Mauritius
Mauritius is a model case that demonstrates both inclusive structural transformation and
primitive diversification. The so-called miracle case is so prominent that various perspectives
on comparative development claim to explain the success that is Mauritius. One notable
example is Robinson (2006), who explains the Guyana-Mauritius divergence on account of
stronger protection of private property and democratic politics in Mauritius. We remain
unconvinced with this narrative. While property rights protection and democracy are part
of the Mauritian story, we argue that these are not fundamental causes of its relative devel-
opment.
Central to the Mauritian story is its colonial history. France controlled the island until
1814, and crucially, the French plantocracy (henceforth franco-Mauritian plantocracy) re-
mained in Mauritius under British control (Sandbrook 2005). Given the colonial past with
Indo- and Afro-Mauritians, there was latent hostility against the franco-Mauritian plantoc-
racy and even the British colonial state kept them at arms length. This was intensified
after World War I when the plantocracy sought retrocession to France. For example, British
judges often ruled in favour of Indo-Mauritians when employer and indentured labourer dis-
putes emerged (Reddi 1997). More strikingly, Sandbrook argues that the British colonizers
encouraged Indo-Hindu Mauritians to fill public bureaucracies as a means to counter the
economic power of the plantocracy.
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Notwithstanding this tenuous relationship between the colonial state and franco-Mauritian
plantocracy at the turn of independence in 1968, Meisenhelder (1999) noted that economic
power still resided in the plantocracy but with a modification that included the creole elite.
Bowman (1991: 119) estimates the top decile income share to be 46.7 percent in the 1970s.
Further, Auty (2017) explains that the planters assembled a pro-growth political coalition
to block a radical redistributive party and formed the first independent government. After a
period of political crises in the immediate years following independence, an implicit bargain
was struck between the plantocracy and the governing elites (Meisenhelder 1999; Seegobin
and Collen 1977).
The central pillar of the bargain was a tax-supported welfare state rather than asset
redistribution. While the tax on sugar exports may demonstrate the sincerity of the bar-
gain, it was largely the outcome of good fortune. Subramaninan and Roy (2003) note that
Mauritius was able to negotiate the largest sugar quota with the EEC/EU at a guaranteed
price average of 90 percent greater than market price. Therefore, it is little surprise that a
sugar tax was economically feasible and acceptable to the plantocracy. But over time, with
the support of the IMF, the plantocracy pressured government to abolish the sugar tax in
1994 (Sandbrook 2005). This was surely related to the subsequent removal of preferential
sugar prices.
We note the following points. First, the contestation between de jure and de facto
political powers was mediated by the good fortune of sugar rents (Greenaway and Lamusse
1999; Subramaninan 2009). This provided government with a lucrative pool of tax revenue
for purposes of diversification and the development of a welfare state. The latter was key
to meeting important consumption needs so that the social peace can be maintained while
wages were low (Meisenhelder 1999). Second, the sugar rents and abatement of underlying
distributional conflict (through the development of the welfare state) made economic elites
less likely to oppose any attempt at structural change.
The Mauritian state used the sugar revenue to ignite a process of industrialization. It
established an Export Processing Zone (EPZ) in the 1970s, imposed foreign exchange con-
trols, undertook import substitution industrialization strategies, infant industry protection
and other forms of market control to enhance export competitiveness (Kothari 2013). Just to
fix ideas consider the following. Carroll and Carroll (1997) show that industrial production
as a percentage of GDP increased from 23 to 33 percent between 1965-1993 (on comparable
terms to South Korea and Singapore for the same period) and by 1985 manufacturing had
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replaced sugar as the country’s largest earner of foreign exchange (Kearney 1990). The EPZ
was particularly attractive, especially to the franco-Mauritian plantocracy (Auty 2017). Its
incentive scheme exempted employers from over time pay, maternity allowance, holiday work
and termination of employment regulations. This is in striking contrast to the rest of the
economy. For example, employers outside the EPZ needed to justify layoffs to a Termination
Contracts and Services Board and compensate laid-off workers (Sandbrook 2005). This was
Mauritius’ attempt to address the distributional issues associated with structural change.
Carroll and Carroll (1999) note that the governing elites widely consulted on policies and
provided free health, education and pension services.
This process of structural change was growth enhancing and inequality reducing. Based
on the World Income and Wealth Database (WID), Mauritius’ top 1 percent fiscal income
share reached a low of 3.9 percent in 2002 as compared to 11.2 percent in 1947. A similar
pattern is observed for its top decile, which reached its trough in 2005 at 14 percent as
compared to 21.6 percent in 1980. This has been a period of inclusive structural change—the
Mauritius miracle. However, the early to mid 2000s marked the trough of the Kuznets wave
and based on WID’s data, top income shares are on an upward trend. This is corroborated
by Bunwaree (2014), who uses Gini coefficients to demonstrate that inequality is on the rise
since the early 2000s. We have explained the Kuznets wave as the outcome of structural
changes, ergo, the recent rise of income inequality suggests that Mauritius is undergoing
some form of primitive diversification. To this we now turn.
From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, the industrialization model was running out of
steam as wages increased and cheaper competitors emerged (Auty 2017). Policy changed in
the direction of promoting luxury tourism and financial services—primitive diversification.
In the early 1990s, a stock market and an offshore banking centre were established with zero
income tax incurred from offshore banking activities (Bunwaree 2014; Meisenhelder 1999).
We argue that these fundamental changes in economic activities are the driving forces behind
the recent upsurge in income inequality—a striking similarity to the Barbados case.
We take the following stock of the Mauritian miracle. First, the institutions of production
promoted a growth-enhancing structural transformation. This industrialization period is
hardly the consequence of simply protecting private property rights. Second, it was the
good fortune of sugar rents that prevented economic elites from pushing Mauritius into the
direction of primitive diversification; and loose labour laws and low wages that attracted
economic elites to the EPZ. Third, it was the good sense of the Mauritian governing elite
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to pre-empt distributional conflict through the creation of a welfare state. In the absence of
these, there would be no Mauritius miracle.
We argue that the fundamental cause of the Mauritian success was its good fortune
of sugar rents that led to a compromise (between de facto and de jure political powers)
of inclusive transformation. Our perspective on Mauritius warrants a short discussion on
ethnic conflict, developmental state and politics in Mauritius. That Mauritius had a highly
competent public service is a given—a necessary but not sufficient condition for inclusive
transformation (as demonstrated by the recent rise of inequality). Moreover, its welfare
state was for all Mauritians, irrespective of ethnicity, an important abatement of ethnic
conflict. But the welfare state was not possible without the good luck of sugar rents. Further,
Mauritius is a parliamentary democracy with coalitions that extend across class and ethnic
lines. This increases group representation and reduces ethnic tensions. But while this form of
parliamentary democracy promotes political stability, its growth and distributional payoffs
are ambiguous in the absence of sugar rents and the sugar compromise.
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a conceptual framework and presents three case studies using a compar-
ative historical analysis methodology that is substantivist in nature. The case studies show
how differences in economic structures are the fundamental cause of differences in economic
development. This insight is derived from a synthesis of competing hypotheses. A given
economic structure gives rise to a particular distribution of income—an important source of
de facto political power. The mechanics of economic change or dynamic under-development
are in turn determined by the intensity of competition between de facto and de jure political
powers and the resolution to this contestation. The protection of private property can be
the underbelly of this contestation when property holders have close ties to a country’s colo-
nial past and/or when property holders are overwhelmingly of one ethnic group. Inclusive
economic development occurs when a distributional bargain is struck and when economic
change engenders a wider diffusion of skills and a lower hierarchy of occupational structure—
lower income inequality. The Mauritius case reveals that it was the good fortune of sugar
rents that gave rise to a distributional bargain and institutions of production that led to
the Mauritian miracle. Our theoretical framework and the history of Guyana, Barbados
and Mauritius, reveal that the distribution of income and economic structure are two laws
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of motion that determine societal evolution. But our framing of the underlying cause of
relative development is still incomplete, if only because these insights need to be formalized
and verified by more historical cases and time-series econometric analyses.
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